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EMERGING CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM:
LIMITATIONS ON THE SPENDING POWER AND
NATIONAL HEALTH PLANNING
With the adoption of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965,1 the federal
government accepted extensive financial responsibility for the medi-
cal care of United States citizens.2 In addition to these programs,
Congress further involved the federal government in the health care
delivery system with the passage of the Heart Disease, Cancer, and
Stroke Amendments of 19651 and the Comprehensive Health Plan-
ning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966.1 The 1965
amendments, ostensibly dealing with major fatal diseases, repre-
sented the initial movement toward regional, rather than state devel-
opment of health facilities and personnel.5 The 1966 amendments,
although producing no dramatic results, signified the first attempt by
the federal government to deal with the concept of health planning.'
Federal treatment of such health concerns is consistent with past
actions by the federal government in the health care sector.7 Never-
Medicare is the popular name for the program of health insurance for the aged
established by the Social Security Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 139511
(1970). Financing for these insurance benefits comes from a trust fund supported by
the Social Security tax. Furthermore, protection beyond these benefits is provided by
the premiums of the beneficiaries and matching governmental contributions. See
generally Wolkstein, Medicare 1971: Changing Attitudes and Changing Legislation, 35
L. & CONTEMP. PROS. 697 (1970); Comment, Medicare-The Great Society's Contribu-
tion To The Elderly, 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 298 (1972).
Medicaid, the Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396 to 1396g (1970), was part of the same legislative package as Medicare. Medicaid,
however, was not based upon specific contributions like Medicare, but instead pro-
vided medical assistance to the medically needy through federal grants-in-aid to
states. See generally Stevens & Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy of a Dilemma, 35 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 348 (1970).
2 Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical Practice: A Critique of the
Professional Standards Review Organization, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 822, 823 (1974).
3 Pub. L. No. 89-239, 79 Stat. 926 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299 to 299i (1970)).
Pub. L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1970)).
See Chapman & Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of Federal
Health Care Legislation, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 334, 345-46 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Chapman & Talmadge].
See id. at 346.
During the first 150 years of United States history, the only health question to
achieve national prominence concerned the authority of the federal government to pass
quarantine laws. See id. at 334-36. Chief Justice Marshall dispatched the issue, how-
ever, with a strict and far reaching dictum in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824). According to Marshall, regulation of interstate and foreign commerce was
specifically delegated to Congress and was a proper area for federal intervention.
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theless, these measures, particularly the disregarding of state bound-
aries and interests by the 1965 amendments, raised questions as to
whether the concept of federalism posed a possible limitation upon
federal action in the health field.8 Further questions concerning the
scope of federal authority in formulating health policy are presented
by provisions of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,
Health matters, however, were not specifically assigned and thus were reserved to the
states. Id. at 203. Although the federal government soon assumed quarantine authority
in the face of a practical abdication of that power by the states, Marshall's dictum
generally controlled federal health actions until the 1930's. See Chapman & Talmadge,
supra note 5, at 337-41.
To confront the hardships of the Depression, however, the Supreme Court held
that the scope of the general welfare clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, would
include health matters and could be defined by Congress rather than by state govern-
ments. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937); Chapman & Talmadge, supra
note 5, at 342-43; text accompanying notes 53-70 infra. Using the general welfare clause
as a foundation, federal health legislation prior to the passage of Medicare, see note 1
supra, focused primarily on improving the quality of health care facilities. The hospital
construction program funded through the Hill-Burton Act, Hospital Survey and Con-
struction Act, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946)(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-
1 (1970)), is representative of these programs. Further federal involvements seemed to
be a logical extension of this trend.
See Chapman & Talmadge, supra note 5, at 345-46.
42 U.S.C. §§ 280c, 300e to 300e-14a (Supp. V 1975). A health maintenance
organization (HMO) is a recent variation of the concept of pre-paid comprehensive
medical services. An HMO is a privately organized health care delivery system which
provides comprehensive medical services, including emphasis on the prevention of
illness or disability, for a fixed per capita price (as opposed to a per service price) paid
in advance by the individual enrollees, Medicare, Medicaid, or through employer-
employee arrangements. See Hanson, The Private Insurance Industry and State Insur-
ance Regulatory Activities as Alternatives to Federally Enacted Comprehensive Na-
tional Health Insurance Legislation, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 677, 703 (1975). The distinctive
characteristic of the HMO system is that the provider of care, rather than a third-party
insurer, is the risk bearer, receiving a pre-paid premium for a largely open-ended
contractual undertaking to provide specified care to meet all the needs of the subscri-
bers. See Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health
Services, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 716, 718 (1970). See also Note, The Role of Prepaid
Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HnAv. L. REv. 887 (1971).
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 offers HMO's financial sup-
port, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-2 to 300e-8 (Supp. V 1975), requires certain employers to
make HMO coverage optional provisions of employee health benefit plans, id. § 300e-
9, and releaseg HMO's from the effect of restrictive state laws, id. § 300e-10. See Rosoff,
Phase Two of the Federal HMO Development Program: New Directions After A Shaky
Start, 1 AM. J. L. & MED. 209, 215 (1975). The Act supersedes any state law requiring
that a medical society approve the furnishing of services by the HMO, 42 U.S.C. §
300e-10(a)(1)(A); that physicians constitute all or a percentage of its governing body,
id. § 300e-10(a)(1)(B); that all physicians or a percentage of physicians in the locale
participate or be permitted to participate in the provisions of services for the HMO,
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and the 1972 Social Security Amendments."0
The most recent, and potentially most expansive, federal action
in the health care sector, however, is the planning and regulatory
system established by the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974." Concerned with the problems of unequal
access to health services, inflationary costs, and misallocation of re-
sources plaguing the health care delivery system, 2 Congress passed
the Act "to facilitate the development of recommendations for a na-
tional health planning policy, to augment areawide and State plan-
ning for health service, manpower, and facilities, and to authorize
id. § 300e-10(a)(1)(C); or that the HMO meet requirements for insurers of health care
services doing business in that state respecting initial capitalization and establishment
of financial reserves to protect against insolvency, id. § 300e-10(a)(1)(D). Furthermore,
states are prevented from passing or enforcing any law which prevents a health mainte-
nance organization from soliciting members through advertising its services, charges,
or other non-professional aspects of its operations. Id. § 300e-10(b). See Rice, Federal
Regulation in the Ambulatory Health Care Sector, 6 U. TOL. L. Rav. 822, 831 (1975).
The elimination of such state legal barriers to the HMO system impinges directly on
the concept of federalism. Id. at 830.
,0 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-19 (Supp. V 1975). The amendments created Pro-
fessional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's), which are self-regulatory organi-
zations of local physicians that monitor individual physicians' decisions affecting the
use of health care resources under Federal health programs. See id. § 1320c-1; Havi-
ghurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role
of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6, 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst & Blum-
stein]. Although the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and some
commentators have emphasized the importance of local development of norms, criteria
and standards effected by the organizations, see Havighurst & Blumstein, supra, at
48-49, the PSRO concept facilitates the movement of health policy decision-making
from the local levels to the federal agencies by establishing a review hierarchy with
ultimate authority vested in the Secretary of HEW. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-l(a)&(d),
1320c-11, 1320c-12 (Supp. V 1975); Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medi-
cal Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organization, 42 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 822, 825-37 (1974). Although guch supervision may be minimal, the very
existence of a federal review procedure suggests that, in spite of the emphasis on local
autonomy and regional standards, the activities and practices of the local organiza-
tions might be directed by the federal government. Such federal regulation could
conflict with state interests protected by the concept of federalism. See Havighurst &
Blumstein, supra, at 47-51.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300t (Supp. V 1975). See generally Atkisson & Grimes,
Health Planning in the United States: An Old Idea with a New Significance, 1 J.
HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 295 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Atkisson & Grimes]. The
constitutionality of the Act "recently was" attacked in federal district court in North
Carolina by the States of North Carolina and Nebraska, the American Medical Asso-
ciation, and the North Carolina Medical Society. The court rejected this attack, how-
ever, and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. North Carolina ex
rel. Kirk v. Califano, No. 76-0049-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 1977), notice of appeal to
S. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 1977.
12 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(Supp. V 1975).
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financial assistance for the development of resources to further that
policy."' 3 To accomplish these ends, the Act has created a compre-
hensive regulatory framework. Although certain aspects of this sys-
tem may become effective without the consent of the states," most
of the provisions, like other grants-in-aid generally, are inoperative
until states subject themselves to these terms by negotiating agree-
ments with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). 5
Congress, however, did not intend to permit states to make a simple
choice concerning participation in the program," because substantial
penalties were included for those states that elect not to participate."
The state participation to be induced by these penalties includes
legislative and administrative support to an intricate system of agen-
cies designed to coordinate health planning policy throughout the
United States. The basic component of this structure consists of a
network of health systems agencies (HSA's) responsible for health
planning and development throughout the country. 8 Each HSA
serves a specific health service area established by the Secretary of
HEW."' Generally, the HSA's are charged with preparing and imple-
menting plans designed for improving the health of the health service
area residents; increasing the accessibility, continuity, and quality of
health services in the area; curbing cost increases in the provision of
health care; and preventing unnecessary duplication of health re-
sources. 20
'3 Id. § 300k(b). See id. § 300k-2 for a listing of congressional priorities for health
planning goals to be achieved by federal, state, and area health planning and resources
development programs.
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300k-1 to 300k-3 (Supp. V 1975).
' See Atkisson & Grimes, supra note 11, at 299. Thus, like other grants-in-aid,
the Act ostensibly permits the states to adopt the "simple expedient" of refusing the
federal benefits. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,
143-44 (1947). See also text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
" See note 15 supra.
'7 See 42 U.S.C. § 300m(d)(Supp. V 1975); text accompanying notes 25-29 infra.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1 (Supp. V 1975). A health systems agency is either a
private, non-profit corporation or a public entity, designated by the Secretary of HEW
to be responsible for health planning and development in a given health service area.
Id. See note 19 infra.
11 A health service area is a geographic region which is conducive to effective
planning and development of health services and satisfies the requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 3001(a)(Supp. V 1975). Although the boundaries of each area were initially
established by state governors, the Secretary of HEW has authority to extend these
regions beyond state lines, id. § 3001(b), and, in fact, several areas presently cross state
borders.
Id. § 3001-2(a). In fulfilling these responsibilities, the HSA's are required to
gather and analyze various kinds of health data from their respective areas; to develop
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In addition to the local HSA's, the planning and regulatory struc-
ture of the Act consists of three other levels of new health agencies-a
National Council on Health Planning and Development,2' State
Health Planning and Development Agencies (SHPDA's), and State-
wide Health Coordinating Councils (SHCC's).? The National Coun-
cil is essentially an advisory organization to the Secretary of HEW.
The state organizations, however, are responsible for the health plan-
ning and development functions at the state level. The SHPDA's
perform essentially the same functions as the HSA's but on a state-
wide basis, while the SHCC's serve primarily as reviewing bodies for
the SHPDA's.4
Since requiring state acceptance of these and other related provi-
sions constitutes a significant intrusion upon state administrative
and legislative autonomy,2 Congress included significant financial
penalties to overcome the anticipated reluctance of the states to par-
ticipate. The Act provided that if a state fails to negotiate a state
agency designation agreement by July, 1980,2 then the Secretary of
HEW must refrain from authorizing funding under numerous federal
long-range health plans for each area and annual implementation plans to fulfill these
long-range goals; to provide technical and financial assistance to individuals or entities
seeking to implement the provisions of these plans; to coordinate these activities with
Professional Standards Review Organizations and other planning and regulatory bod-
ies; to review and approve applications for federal funds for area health programs; to
assist states in resource utilization reviews; and to recommend to the states projects
for modernization, construction, and conversion of medical facilities in appropriate
areas. See id. § 3001-2(a)-(h).
21 Id. § 300k-3.
2 Id. § 300m.
2 Id. § 300m-3.
24 See id. §§ 300m-2 and 300m-3(c).
11 See Atkisson & Grimes, supra note 11, at 299. The requirement that the SHPDA
"administer a State certificate or need program which applies to new institutional
health services proposed to be offered or developed within the state," 42 U.S.C. §
300m-2(4)(B)(Supp. V 1975), particularly has met with resistance. Certificate of need
laws regulate entry into the health services industry and investments in health care
facilities by requiring a prior administrative determination that a public need for
additional facilities or services exist. See generally Havighurst, Regulation of Health
Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need," 59 VA. L. Rv. 1143 (1973).
The certificate of need requirement poses an unusually difficult problem for the
State of North Carolina because certificate of need legislation has been held violative
of the North Carolina Constitution as a denial of equal protection of law and an illegal
monopoly and exclusive privilege. See In re Certificate Of Need For Aston Park Hosp.,
Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973). This dilemma precipitated an unsuccessful
attack upon the constitutionality of the National Health Resources and Development
Act of 1974 by the States of North Carolina and Nebraska and two medical associa-
tions. See note 11 supra.
21 See Atkisson & Grimes, supra note 11, at 300; text accompanying notes 14-15
supra.
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health programs until such an agreement becomes effective.Y The
loss of such a substantial portion of federal health funding would have
a crippling effect upon the delivery of health services in most states.2
Furthermore, conditioning continued federal support for such a broad
range of programs upon state compliance with federal requirements
will have a serious impact upon traditional state legislative and fiscal
functions.
29
Legislation containing such conditions may be constitutionally
defective as an infringement of the principles of federalism inherent
in the Constitution. The tenth amendment" represents the clearest
expression of this balance of power between state and federal govern-
ments.13 Immediately upon the amendment's ratification, however,
two distinct interpretations emerged. The Federalists considered the
federal government to be supreme in its area of delegated powers, and
asserted that federal action under any of the enumerated powers
42 U.S.C. § 300m(d)(Supp. V 1975), requires the Secretary to refrain from
making
any allotment, grant, loan, or loan guarantee, or enter into any con-
tract, under this chapter [The Public Health Service], the Com-
munity Mental Health Centers Act, or the Comprehensive Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act
of 1970 for the development, expansion, or support of health resources
in such State until such time as such an agreement is in effect.
This sanction would result in a loss of federal funds in almost fifty programs under
the Public Health Act alone. See id. §§ 201 to 300t (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
21 See Atkisson & Grimes, supra note 11, at 300. The withdrawal of benefits under
these programs would undoubtedly reduce the health policies in many states to chaos.
In North Carolina, for example, the revenue from these federal programs amounts to
over forty-nine million dollars, a substantial portion of the state's health budget. See
Memorandum for Plaintiff Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment at 19, North
Carolina ex rel. Kirk v. Califano No. 76-0049-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 1977), notice of
appeal to S. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 1977. North Carolina alleged that the loss of these benefits
would cause the state's entire health care system to break down. Id. at 26.
" In North Carolina's situation, such conditions present direct interference with
that state's constitutional protections. See note 25 supra.
30 U.S. CONST. amend. X, states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
31 See Comment, An Affirmative Constitutional Right: The Tenth Amendment
and the Resolution of Federalism Conflicts, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 876, 877 (1976).
Although the Constitution contains many implicit recognitions of the federal system,
such as the method of electing the House of Representatives, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
absent the tenth amendment, the only express recognition of the concept is the provi-
sion in article four that "[tihe United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government. . . ." Id. art. IV § 4. See generally Corwin,
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
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justified ignoring any possible interference with state activity." The
Madisonians, however, viewed the basic governmental organization
established by the Constitution as a compact of free and independent
states, the national government concerned with the external relation-
ships of these states, while the states regulated their internal affairs.33
From this perspective, any federal activity that interfered with the
states' control over internal affairs violated the tenth amendment.
34
Both interpretations have been postulated by the Supreme Court at
one time or another. 5 With a limited exception concerning the taxing
power,3" the issue appeared to have been settled, however, by the
Court's declaration in United States v. Darby7 that the amendment
is merely a "truism" and provides no substantive limitation of federal
32 See Cowen, What Is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C. L. Rxv. 154, 157
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Cowen]. Chief Justice Marshall stated the classic formu-
lation of the federalist position in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819). Considering the significance of the omission of the word "expressly" as a quali-
fication of delegated powers he wrote:
Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for purpose of quieting
the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word
"expressly," and declares only that powers "not delegated to the
United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States
or to the people"; thus leaving the question, whether the particular
power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated
to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair
construction of the whole instrument.
Id. at 406.
3 See Cowen, supra note 32, at 157. See also Casto, The Doctrinal Development
of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 227, 228 (1949).
31 See Cowen, supra note 32, at 157.
1 The Court had adhered to the Madisonian interpretation by adopting the doc-
trine of "dual federalism," which construed the states' reserved powers under the tenth
amendment to restrict the scope of national powers and to segregate state and federal
legislative and regulatory spheres. See generally Corwin, The Passing of Dual
Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950). The doctrine reached its zenith in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), where the Court held that the tenth amendment
precluded the exclusion of goods produced by child labor from interstate commerce as
an impermissible exercise of federal power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court
abandoned this approach in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), in favor of
the less restrictive Federalist interpretation. Overruling Hammer, the Darby Court
declared that the tenth amendment merely restates the fact that the federal govern-
ment is one of delegated powers and that those powers not constitutionally allocated
to the central government are retained by the states. Id. at 124. See text accompanying
notes 37-38 infra. See generally Percy, National League of Cities v. Usery: The Tenth
Amendment Is Alive and Doing Well, 51 TuL. L. REv. 95, 98-101 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Percy].
u' See text accompanying notes 40-49 infra.
31 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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power .3 Nevertheless, the Court has recently resurrected the concept
of structural federalism embodied in the tenth amendment as a pros-
cription of delegated federal authority.
39
The exercise of federal authority to tax and spend," and to regu-
late commerce,4 frequently has been attacked as violative of the
principle of tenth amendment federalism.2 Until National League of
Cities v. Usery,13 the commerce and spending powers were virtually
unchecked since the demise of the concept of dual federalism.44 Nev-
ertheless, the states had found protection from federal intrusion into
their affairs through tenth amendment limitations on the taxing
power. This was accomplished under the broad rubric of
"intergovernmental immunities." 5 Although the early absolute char-
acter of the immunity eventually gave way to a more flexible ap-
proach," the theory that certain state functions are immune from
39 Id. at 124. The Darby Court stated that the amendment merely declared the
relationship between national and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution. Id.
" See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); text accompanying
notes 86-142 infra.
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, states that "Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; ......
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, states that Congress has the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
42 See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTrrUION OF THE
UNITED STATES 1263-71 (1973); Cowen, supra note 32, at 169-76.
43 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See text accompanying notes 86-142 infra.
, See note 35 supra; text accompanying notes 50-85 infra.
45 Chief Justice Marshall formulated the doctrine of intergovernmental immuni-
ties in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Holding that the
supremacy clause prevented state taxation of bank notes issued by a branch of the
Bank of the United States, the McCulloch Court announced the famous maxim that
the "power to tax involves the power to destroy." Id. at 431. Justice Marshall found
that state taxation or regulation of federal instrumentalities presents a possibility of
interference with substantive federal policy sufficient to raise a presumption of federal
immunity from state taxation. Id. at 428-31. See generally Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in
Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 683, 700-11 (1976). This principle
later was extended on tenth amendment grounds to give the states reciprocal immun-
ity from the federal taxing power. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
11 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), overruling Collector
v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). In Day, the immunity for state officials had been
derived from the immunity afforded the state. This immunity was confined by Graves,
however, to a more limited immunity protecting only state functions that were deemed
to be intrinsically governmental, rather than protecting state officials. To establish the
scope of this immunity, the Court emphasized that enterprises of a "proprietary"
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federal taxing power has persisted." In New York v. United States,4"
for example, although upholding the validity of a federal tax on min-
eral water sold by the State of New York, the Supreme Court reiter-
ated the idea that certain state functions are exempt from federal
taxation. 9
Although states enjoy a somewhat ambiguous measure of immun-
ity from the federal taxing power, congressional authority under the
spending power has encountered no restraints in recent decades. As
with the tenth amendment,"0 the spending power has been ap-
proached on two general theories, one Madisonian, the other Hamil-
tonian. While Madison believed that congressional spending for the
general welfare should be limited to spending incidental to a dele-
gated power, Hamilton and the Federalists interpreted the clause to
be a grant of substantial power by its own terms.5 Whatever contro-
versy may have surrounded the power, the Court resolved the issue
in United States v. Butler2 by holding that the clause conferred a
substantive power to appropriate independent of the enumerated
powers, and limited only by the requirement that it be exercised to
provide for the general welfare of the United States.
rather than "governmental" character were not exempt from taxation. See, e.g.,
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936)(state-operated railroads); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (state liquor monopoly). A state activity is "proprietary"
when it is of an essentially private character, that is, one not traditionally limited to
government action. See Note, State Governmental Immunity From Federal Regulation
Based On The Commerce Clause-National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 DE PAUL L.
REv. 101, 110-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause Immunity].
11 See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
" Id.
4' The New York decision marked a departure from the "proprietary" -and
"governmental" distinction, but to what extent is unclear because of the divergent
opinions in the case. The plurality characterized such distinctions as "untenable cri-
teria," id. at 583, recognizing, however, that functions completely unique to a state
government might be immune from federal taxation, id. at 582. Four concurring jus-
tices acknowledged that even a non-discriminatory tax might "interfere unduly with
the State's performance of its sovereign functions of government." Id. at 587 (Stone,
C. J., concurring). Thus, although the "proprietary" and "governmental" distinction
may have been compromised, a sphere of immunity does exist for certain state func-
tions. See Percy, supra note 35, at 102-03; Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note
46, at 111 n.52.
5 See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
51 See Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits,
70 Nw. U. L. REv. 293, 297-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Conditional Spending]. See
also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1936).
52 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Id. at 65-66. See Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 298-300. The Butler
Court, however, reached the somewhat incongruous decision that the Agricultural
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The Butler conception of the spending power was soon expanded
by the decisions in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis5 and Helvering v.
Davis.5 The premise of both decisions was that Congress may spend
in aid of the general welfare,5" and that "the concept of welfare or the
opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states." 57 The Court thus
made clear that Congress may use the spending power to inject itself
into local matters over which the federal government has no direct
regulatory power. 8
Nevertheless, Steward Machine and Helvering recognized that
the spending power does have limits, however ill-defined. Steward
Machine confronted the problem of whether tax credits against the
federal tax, granted to employers for taxes paid to states under the
Social Security Act, coerced state compliance with the Act's provi-
sions. 9 The Court noted that although the distinction between com-
pulsion and inducement was one of degree,"0 the Social Security Act
did not prevent the states from choosing whether to comply with the
provisions."' The distinction was thus drawn between coercive and
persuasive expenditures." The Court's application of this distinction,
Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), was an unconstitutional invasion of powers
reserved to the states. The majority did not believe that Congress could invoke the
taxing and spending power as a means to reach a matter not within the powers dele-
gated to the national government. 297 U.S. at 72-74. This holding effectively emascu-
lated the determination that the spending power was an independent grant of substan-
tive authority.
5' 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
301 U.S. 619 (1937). Both Steward Machine and Helvering upheld various sec-
tions of the Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935)(codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 640.
5 Id. at 645. The most recent formulation of the principle that the "general wel-
fare" is defined by Congress is found in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court
there stated that the general welfare clause is a grant of substantive power, and that
Congress shall "decide which expenditures will promote the general welfare." Id. at
90. The Court stated further that the spending power is not limited by the direct grants
of legislative power found in the Constitution, but that other constitutional limitations
upon that granted power may exist. Id. at 91.
Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 301.
' Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 584.
60 Id. at 590.
" Id. The Court stated that it could not say that Alabama was not acting "of her
unfettered will, but under the strain of a persuasion equivalent to undue influence,
when she chose to have relief administered under laws of her own making . Id.
62 The Court phrased the coercion/persuasion distinction as follows:
It is one thing to impose a tax dependent upon the conduct of the
taxpayers, or of the state in which they live, where the conduct to be
stimulated or discouraged is unrelated to the fiscal need subserved by
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however, reveals a reluctance to hold an act of Congress coercive upon
the states.13 In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Commission," the Court indicated that as long as a state may adopt
the "simple expedient" of not yielding to the alleged coercion, state
sovereignty is not infringed.65 Emphasizing that the tenth amend-
ment did not deprive Congress of the authority to use all means
appropriate to the exercise of a granted power, the Court held that
the United States has the "power to fix the terms upon which its
money allotments to the states shall be disbursed."" Unlike other
exercises of federal power, however, the supremacy clause 7 does not
demand that states accept federal funding." Thus, because states are
theoretically free to resist any appropriation for the general welfare,
the practical effect of the coercion test as a restraint upon federal
power is minimal.
The Court's discussion in Helvering v. Davis, however, suggests
that considerations of state sovereignty may prevent this authority
from being limitless. 9 Although conditional appropriations are not
required to have a logical relation to any enumerated authority, they
still may be required to have a reasonable relation to the purposes of
the spending program itself. 70 By requiring a reasonable relation be-
the tax in its normal operation, or to any other end legitimately na-
tional .... It is quite another thing to say that a tax will be abated
upon the doing of an act that will satisfy the fiscal need, the tax and
the alternative being approximate equivalents. In such circumstances,
if in no others, inducement or persuasion does not go beyond the
bounds of power. We do not fix the outermost line.
Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 591 (citations omitted).
0 Butler appears to be the only Supreme Court decision that even impliedly
invalidates a congressional appropriation for its coercive effect on the states. See
Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 307.
' 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
Id. at 143-44. Oklahoma involved the removal of the state highway commis-
sioner for political activities in violation of the Hatch Act, (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1508 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). He had been employed in connection with an
activity funded in part by federal funds, and unless Oklahoma removed him from
office, federal highway grants would be withheld in an amount equal to two-year's
compensation of the commissioner. 330 U.S. at 132-33. The Court held that Oklahoma
could have resisted the directive and therefore was not coerced to remove the officer.
Id. at 143-44.
" 330 U.S. at 143. Accord Lau v. Nichols, 313 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
" See Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 303.
'5 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 640-45.
70 See Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 303. The Helvering Court indicated
that a tenth amendment attack on an exercise of spending authority requires "a show-
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tween the condition and the purpose of a spending program to protect
the principles of federalism, the tenth amendment limits the exercise
of congressional spending authority."' That the Court has never found
the application of such a sanction to be necessary makes it no less a
constitutional limit on the scope of the spending power.
7
1
Although the tenth amendment has provided at least a theoretical
restriction on the spending power, in the past few decades federal
legislation under the commerce clause 73 has been virtually unlimited,
resulting in a continued expansion of federal regulation into areas
previously reserved to state governments. 4 Beginning with United
States v. California, 75 the Court has consistently refused to limit oth-
erwise .valid federal commercial regulations merely because they im-
ing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide
range of discretion permitted to the Congress" to determine what constitutes the
general welfare. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 641, quoting United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 69 (1936). In this regard, Congress' discretion is circumscribed only by the
definition of a general welfare rather than a particular welfare. If an exercise of discre-
tion is within these bounds, no attack will be successful "unless the choice is clearly
wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment." Id. at 640. The Court
further stated that "the concept of the general welfare [is not] static" and "changes
with the times." Id. at 641. These statements indicate that, even within the bounds of
the requirement that conditions must reasonably relate to the purposes of the spending
program, Congress has sufficient latitude to execute a broad range of national policies.
For further support of the reasonable relation requirement, see Ivanhoe Irrigation
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974).
See generally Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 303-10.
71 See cases cited note 70 supra. More recently, the Court has recognized that the
spending power has constitutional limitations without directly discussing the tenth
amendment. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) ("any limitations upon
the exercise of [the spending] power must be found elsewhere in the Constitution.");
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) ("whatever may be the limits of [the spend-
ing] power. . . they have not been reached here."). This broader treatment of spend-
ing power limitations does not suggest, however, that the tenth amendment should no
longer be regarded as an effective check on congressional spending authority. The tenth
amendment stands as perhaps the clearest of all constitutional limitations upon fed-
eral power and logically must be one of the limitations to which the Court alluded in
these cases.
72 See Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 307.
13 See note 41 supra.
11 See Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 108.
73 297 U.S. 175 (1936). California involved a state-owned railroad's violation of
§ 6 of the Federal Safety Appliance Act (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 6 (1970)),
passed under commerce clause authority. Rejecting an analogy to tax immunity, the
Court held that unlike restrictions on the federal taxing power, the congressional power
to regulate commerce was plenary, and equated the power to control a state with the
power to control an individual. 297 U.S. at 184-85.
19771 SPENDING POWER AND HEALTH PLANNING 1145
pinged upon state interests. 6 The pronouncement in Darby that the
tenth amendment was but a "truism"" effectively declared that be-
cause federal power under the commerce clause is paramount, coun-
tervailing state policies or interests warranted no consideration.
78
Although after Darby the tenth amendment appeared impotent to
shield the states from federal intrusion under the commerce clause,
the theory still garnered adherents, with Justice Douglas being the
most notable. Dissenting in Maryland v. Wirtz," Justice Douglas
asserted that the concept of federalism placed affirmative limitations
on the commerce power." The Wirtz majority upheld the extension
.of the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 193882 to the employees of state-operated
hospitals and schools as a valid exercise of commerce clause author-
"' Since California, judicial inquiry into the validity of congressional legislation
uider the commerce clause has been limited to determining whether such legislation
effectuates a legitimate end affecting individuals engaged in interstate commerce, and
whether the means chosen by Congress bears a rational relationship to that end. See,
e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); United
States'v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1940). The Court has applied this analysis when
state activities were involved as well. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190
(1968); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527-28 (1941).
See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); Commerce
Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 108.
" See text accompanying note 38 supra.
7 See Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 105. Prior to the theory
established in California, Darby and other more recent commerce clause cases, the
Supreme Court considered the tenth amendment a significant limitation of the com-
merce clause authority. The Court regarded a certain class of activities to be of a purely
local character and thus protected from federal regulation by the tenth amendment.
See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See generally Light, The Federal
Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. Rav. 717, 721-24 (1963). Generally, these cases dealt with
individual private actions rather than state activities. The approach did not concern
who the actor was, but rather whether the activity was purely local and thus immune
from federal regulation under the tenth amendment. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
71 Justice Douglas first elaborated his position in his dissent in New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590 (1946), a taxing power case. See text accompanying
notes 48-49 supra. Justice Douglas firmly believed that state sovereignty should not
be left completely to the will of Congress. In his view, states "become subject to
interference and control both in the functions which they exercise and the methods
which they employ" if they are subjected to the federal taxing power. Id. at 595
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
- 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968)(Douglas, J., dissenting). Wirtz was overruled by Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
" 392 U.S. at 204.
29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1970).
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ity. 3 Justice Douglas, however, believed that the disruption in state
fiscal policy that would result from this extension threatened state
autonomy." He asserted that the tenth amendment attests to the
sovereignty of the states and prevents the federal government from
unduly interfering with a state's performance of its sovereign govern-
mental functions.
8 5
In the plurality opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,"6
Justice Rehnquist followed an analysis similar to that of Justice
Douglas. The Court there held that extending minimum wage and
maximum hour coverage" to virtually all non-supervisory and non-
elected personnel of state and local governments impermissibly oper-
ated "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. .. ."
Thus, for the first time in forty years, the Supreme Court held that
enforcement of a legitimate exercise of the commerce power was pro-
hibited by the concept of state sovereignty."'
392 U.S. at 188-99. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)(1970).
'4 392 U.S. at 203. See Percy, supra note 35, at 96-97.
392 U.S. at 205.
" 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Four justices supported the League of Cities plurality.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result but asserted that the application of any tenth
amendment limitations on the commerce power should be controlled by a balancing
test. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See text accompanying note 120 infra. See
generally Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League
of Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Beaird & Ellington]; Percy,
supra note 46; Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the New
Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1871, 1871-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Municipal
Bankruptcy]; Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-1974
Amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act Extending Coverage to Public Agencies
Exceed the Commerce Power By Infringing Upon State Sovereignty Protected By the
Tenth Amendment-National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976), 25
EMORY L.J. 937 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Infringing State Sovereignty]; Recent
Decision, Ccnstitutional Law-Tenth Amendment-Fair Labor Standards
Act-Minimum Wage Requirement Held Inapplicable to State Employees, 60 MARQ.
L. REv. 185 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wage Requirement].
" The provisions in question were amendments to the same section of the Fair
Labor Standards Act contested in Maryland v. Wirtz. See text accompanying note 82
supra. Because of the *imilarity of issues, the League of Cities Court chose to overrule
Wirtz. 426 U.S. at 854.
426 U.S. at 852.
Percy, supra note 35, at 97. The Court's holding that state sovereignty may limit
an exercise of the commerce power is consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's famous
means-end analysis in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
By the terms of that analysis, the wage and hour provisions are appropriate means to
a legitimate end, but they are otherwise prohibited by the constitutional concepts of
federalism.
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Clearly, the import of League of Cities is the revival of the tenth
amendment as an affirmative limitation on commerce clause author-
ity. If the issues involved had concerned merely congressional legisla-
tion exceeding the commerce power, the Court's analysis would have
been framed in the context of a failure to establish a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate object of interstate commerce.90 In his
plurality opinion in League of Cities, however, Justice Rehnquist
discussed the tenth amendment9 and concluded that the states' abil-
ity to function effectively in the federal system would be impaired by
enforcement of the wage and hour requirements.12 Such reasoning
may portend a movement toward a new concept of structural federal-
ism that will be an important factor in future consideration of state
sovereignty claims.93
The League of Cities plurality premised such reasoning on two
principal lines of authority. The Court emphasized the essential role
of the states in our federal system by drawing an analogy to the
recognized state immunity from federal taxation.94 Perhaps more sig-
nificant is the reliance in League of Cities upon the shift in the tradi-
tional commerce clause analysis employed by the Court in Maryland
v. Wirtz9" and Fry v. United States.8 Although both cases upheld
The last commerce clause enactment found to infringe powers reserved to the
states was the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (1935),
struck down by the Court in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
See note 76 supra; Percy, supra note 35, at 105.
" 426 U.S. at 842-43.
12 Id. at 852, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
'1 Structural federalism recognizes the states as vital entities in the constitutional
system and seeks to enhance their autonomy. See Beaird & Ellington, supra note 86,
at 47-48.
11 See 426 U.S. at 843; see also text accompanying notes 40-49. The Court had
rejected a similar analogy in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936), as
Justice Brennan indicated in his League of Cities dissent, 426 U.S. at 866. The League
of Cities plurality. noted, however, that both the taxing power and the commerce power
are delegated powers and that the tax immunity derives from state sovereignty and
the barriers which it presents to otherwise plenary federal authority. Id. at 843 n.14.
Since the practical effect of taxation is often virtually indistinguishable from that of
regulation, state immunity from federal regulation may be even more vital to the
preservation of the federal system than immunity from taxation, because regulation
affects state policy choices as well as revenues. See Commerce Clause Immunity, supra
note 46, at 112.
-5 392 U.S. 183 (1968). See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra for a discussion
of Justice Douglas' dissent to the Wirtz decision.
Is 421 U.S. 542 (1975). Fry involved a challenge to the freeze of wages and salaries
of state employees imposed by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§
1901-1909 (1970). Relying on Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), the Court found
that the federal legislation could significantly affect interstate commerce and was
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commerce clause legislation, the League of Cities Court inferred a
clear trend toward greater protection of state sovereignty from dicta
in those cases. In Wirtz, the Court had assured the appellants that it
had "ample power to prevent . . .'the utter destruction of the State
as a sovereign political entity."'' 7 Furthermore, the Wirtz Court rec-
ognized that the commerce power does have limits. The plurality in
League of Cities contended that such statements recognized limits
upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty through the
commerce power." Fry, however, provided direct support for this
principle. The Court in Fry established a basis for the rehabilitation
of the tenth amendment by stating that:
[w]hile the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not
been surrendered," . . . it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system.'
By relying on these dicta from Wirtz and Fry, the League of Cities
Court found authority for the position that some congressional regu-
latory measures under the commerce clause might exceed limits im-
posed by the concept of federalism. 0' According to the standards
therefore a valid exercise of the commerce power. 421 U.S. at 547. See also note 76
supra.
9" 392 U.S. at 196 (footnote omitted).
" Id.
See 426 U.S. at 842.
"' 421 U.S. at 547 n.7. Fry is also instructive as to the reasoning employed in
League of Cities because Justice Rehnquist, the author of the League of Cities decision,
revealed his basic understanding of the concept of federalism in his Fry dissent. Justice
Rehnquist contended that the state's claim was not based simply on the absence of
congressional legislative authority, but rather on "an affirmative constitutional right,
inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally asserted author-
ity." Id. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Believing that the tenth amendment pro-
tects traditional state functions from federal regulation, he emphasized that "there can
be no more fundamental constitutional question than that of the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution as to how authority should be allocated between the
National and State Governments." Id. at 559. The analysis employed in Justice
Rehnquist's Fry dissent therefore closely parallels that used in his majority opinion in
League of Cities.
"I1 See Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 114. The League of Cities
Court also emphasized the degree to which the wage and hour requirements would
interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty. Concluding that the power to
determine wages and hours of those employed to carry out governmental functions is
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established in League of Cities, the tenth amendment thus guaran-
tees to the states "freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions" without federal regulation
under commerce clause authority."2
Nevertheless, the scope of the immunity provided these essential
governmental functions by the League of Cities endorsement of the
implicit structural limitations of the federal system remains un-
clear. ' 3 Justice Rehnquist framed at least two possible interpreta-
tions regarding the appropriate application of such a defense by a
state. The protection of functions essential to a state's separate and
independent existence is a theme running throughout the Court's
decision. 4 Under this theory, congressional displacement of any
function which, if allowed, "may substantially restructure traditional
ways in which the local governments have arranged their affairs,"'05
would be prohibited as beyond the authority granted Congress by the
commerce clause. 00 The Court's failure to evaluate the federal inter-
an unquestionable aspect of state sovereignty, 426 U.S. at 845, the Court found that
the requirements significantly would affect governmental functions by increasing costs
in providing essential police and fire protection, without an .increase in service, by
forcing relinquishment of important governmental activities, and by displacing state
policies and choices regarding the manner in which it will structure delivery of govern-
mental services which its citizens require. Id. at 846-48. Thus, the dilemma faced by
the states was either to attempt to increase revenue to meet the increased financial
burden imposed by the restrictions, or restructure their governmental policies to ac-
commodate the reallocation of available resources. Id. at 848. See Wage Requirement,
supra note 86, at 192-93.
"1 426 U.S. at 852. The dissent in League of Cities implied that the majority
holding represented a return to the application of the tenth amendment employed
before the Depression. Id. at 867-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). That approach, however,
focused on whether the subject matter of the commerce clause legislation was local in
character and thus immune from federal regulation, or was appropriately under federal
authority as a national concern. See note 78 supra. The thrust of the majority's deci-
sion is directed not toward the subject matter of the regulation, but toward the entity
affected by the regulation. As the Court noted, the Act speaks "directly to the State
qua States." 426 U.S. at 847. Since the majority holding is reaching a "power" inherent
in a state as a governmental entity rather than a traditionally local "activity," the
standard seems more in line with the language of the tenth amendment, see note 1
supra, and thus inapposite to the pre-Depression application of the tenth amendment.
Justice Brennan's criticism therefore seems misplaced in this respect. See Commerce
Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 105 n.22.
,o See Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 114.
Zo, See 426 U.S. at 843, 845, 851, 852. The Court cited Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S.
559 (1911), as exemplifying this principle. In Coyle, the Court prevented Congress from
determining the'location of Oklahoma's seat of government, reasoning that such a
determination would be an invasion of essential state powers. Id. at 565.
" 426 U.S. at 849.
, Id. at 852 Justice Rehnquist specified ways in which the wage and hour restric-
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est in applying the wage and hour provisions to the states supports
the recognition of an inflexible category of essential governmental
functions completely immune from federal regulation.' 7 This broad
immunity could be construed to exclude entirely the national govern-
ment from even minimal interference in the area of internal state
governmental operations.' 8 As Justice Brennan indicated in his
League of Cities dissent, such a construction could have a startling
effect on commerce clause regulation and the structure of the federal
system. '09
The plurality opinion, however, posits an alternative proposition
to the absolute immunity prescribed by the essential function theory.
The Court's overruling of Maryland v. Wirtz" would seem to suggest
that Fry v. United States, "' which relied principally on Wirtz, should
be overruled as well. Declaring that the dictum in United States v.
California' 2 equating states with individuals under the commerce
clause was "simply wrong,' 1 3 the League of Cities plurality justified
tions had an impermissible effect on functions or policy decisions reserved to the states.
See note 101 supra. He indicated, however, that he did not believe that such particular-
ized assessments of actual impact were crucial to the decision. 426 U.S. at 851. The
dispositive factor was that Congress had "attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause
authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States
in their capacities as sovereign governments." Id. at 852. See Beaird & Ellington, supra
note 86, at 62-63; Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 66, at 114-15; Wage Re-
quirement, supra note 86, at 191-93.
107 See Note, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Threat to Federalism?,
76 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1015 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Federalism Threat].
"I' See Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 114-15.
1 See 426 U.S. at 875-76. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted that
the political structure of the federal government sufficiently protected the interests of
the states. He argued that because representatives elected from the states dominate
the federal political system, those representatives are unlikely to disregard totally the
state concerns. See id. at 876-77; Infringing State Sovereignty, supra note 86, at 951-
52. See generally, Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 543 (1954). This total identification of the states with their elected representatives
is likely to be inaccurate. The interest of the state is generally only one of a number of
conflicting pressures determining a representative's vote on any given issue. See Mu-
nicipal Bankruptcy, supra note 86, at 1855. See generally D. MATHEWS, U.S. SENATORS
AND THEMIR WORLD 92-242 (Vantage Books, 1960). When controlling state conduct may
weaken the ability of the states to govern effectively, courts should not abdicate their
responsibility to scrutinize federal regulations which may interfere with state sover-
eignty. See Federalism Threat, supra note 107, at 1018; Municipal Bankruptcy, supra
note 86, at 1885.
"" 426 U.S. at 855. See text accompanying notes 80-85 and 95-99 supra.
421 U.S. 542 (1975). See text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.
,,2 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 198 (1936).
" 426 U.S. at 854-55.
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overruling Wirtz because that decision relied on this dictum and thus
contradicted the Court's conclusion that states stand on a different
footing than individuals in regard to integral governmental func-
tions."' The plurality, however, distinguished Fry from League of
Cities and Wirtz by emphasizing the national economic emergency
which the legislation challenged in Fry addressed, the less intrusive
nature of that legislation's financial impact and the short period of
effectiveness." 5 The Court therefore refrained from overruling Fry.1
6
If the tenth amendment serves to bar any federal intrusion under the
commerce clause into essential state functions, however, the national
significance, low cost, or short duration of such an action cannot
supply a power beyond the scope of the Constitution."' Consideration
of such factors is incongruous with any theory of absolute immun-
ity." ' Thus, the Court's treatment of these considerations suggests
that a more flexible balancing approach is being applied."' Indeed,
1"' Id.
", Id. at 852-53. See Federalism Threat, supra note 107, at 1014; Commerce
Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 115.
' 426 U.S. at 852-53.
, See Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 116.
"1 Id. at 115. A review of recent eleventh amendment decisions written by Justice
Rehnquist further indicates that, although the protection of state fiscal integrity is a
strong consideration when evaluating federal regulations, state monetary policies are
not absolutely immune from federal intrusion. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Dissenting in Fry, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the tenth and eleventh
amendments were linked conceptually by the overriding principle of state sovereignty.
421 U.S. at 557. In Edelman, he had demonstrated that the eleventh amendment
stands as an affirmative protection of state fiscal integrity. 415 U.S. at 663. Neverthe-
less, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Fitzpatrick held that the eleventh amend-
ment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are limited by the
enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. 427
U.S. at 356. The language of the fourteenth amendment is directed specifically at the
states and therefore gives Congress plenary authority, id., making the use of a balanc-
ing approach unnecessary in Fitzpatrick. These decisions clearly indicate that the
protection afforded state fiscal policies by the eleventh amendment is not absolute.
Since Justice Rehnquist believes that both the eleventh and tenth amendments repre-
sent a desire to protect the structure of federalism as embodied in the Constitution,
he may believe that the protection afforded state fiscal policies by the tenth amend-
ment is likewise not absolute. See generally Beaird & Ellington, supra note 86.
"I The Court's recognition that Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), was not over-
ruled may further support the proposition that the League of Cities holding defines a
balancing of state and national interests. See 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. Case involved a
tenth amendment challenge to wartime economic regulations. The logical explanation
for the League of Cities Court's position is that the plurality believed that the national
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Justice Blackmun specifically adhered to that approach in his con-
curring opinion.
20
interest in maintaining economic stability during a time of war outweighs a state's
interest in having its sales activity free of federal controls. See Federalism Threat,
supra note 107, at 1016.
The Court has applied a similar balancing test in considering individual and
government interests in first amendment cases. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (state's interest in universal education could not subordinate significant
interest that Amish parents demonstrated with respect to religious upbringing of their
children); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in regulating the non-speech element in "symbolic speech" can justify
limitations on first amendment freedom of speech). See generally Ely, Flag Desecra-
tion: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
For further discussion supporting the application of a balancing approach in tenth
amendment cases see Beaird & Ellington, supra note 86, at 61-72; Commerce Clause
Immunity, supra note 46, at 114-17.
20 Justice Blackmun stated that the Court's opinion "adopts a balancing ap-
proach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environinental protection,
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential." 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
Three federal courts recently have indicated that when federal environmental
protection laws conflict with state reserved powers the state sovereignty interests
should prevail. See Maryland v. Environmental Protection Agency, 530 F.2d 215 (4th
Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975). These cases involved
a challenge to the attempted compulsion of state officials to implement the compre-
hensive anti-pollution program established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 to 18571 (1970). The amendments authorized the EPA administrator
to promulgate his own air pollution control plan-for any state that failed to submit a
plan which complied with the statutory criteria for such regulations. Id. § 1857(c)(1).
The air pollution standards, however, were directed primarily at pollutants emitted
by automobiles, and compliance required extensive use of transportation control pro-
grams. Many states were either unable or unwilling to impose such controls, so the
EPA issued federal controls which directly regulated governmental activities of the
states. See Federalism Threat, supra note 107, at 996-97. A refusal to satisfy these
requirements could subject state officials to both civil and criminal penalties. 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970). All three circuits indicated that the dictation of legislation to
a state legislature by a federal agency acting under authority of the commerce clause
violates a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty protected by the tenth amend-
ment. See 530 F.2d at 225-28; 521 F.2d at 989-94; id. at 840-42. But see Pennsylvania
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 500 F.2d 246 (3rd Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
considered these cases but declined to decide the issue because the EPA acknowledged
that the programs were invalid unless modified, and therefore the Court remanded the
cases as moot. See Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
See generally Salmon, The Federalist Principle: The Interaction of the Commerce
Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air Act, 2 COLUM. J. ENvT'L L. 290
(1976); Federalism Threat, supra note 107; Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of
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The lower federal courts applying League of Cities have adopted
such an analysis in cases presenting questions under the Equal Pay
Act'"' and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
'2
both passed upon commerce clause authority. 2 3 In Usery v. Dallas
Independent School District,'24 a Texas district court ruled that
League of Cities should be applied "very conservatively," and held
that the Equal Pay Act could be sustained under the fourteenth
amendment.'1 The court held that any limitation imposed by the
tenth amendment upon the commerce power was itself limited by.
three factors: the essential functions protected must be of an internal,
administrative, management, or housekeeping character; the exercise
of the commerce power must substantially disrupt state operations;
and the state interest must not be outweighed by a national policy.'12
In the court's opinion, League of Cities could be harmonized with
traditional commerce clause thinking only by such an "ad hoc bal-
ancing."' 27
The Utah district court in Usery v. Board of Education2 followed
a similar approach in upholding the ADEA against a tenth amend-.
ment attack. Construing League of Cities "to require balancing of
state and federal interests. . . even where integral state governmen-
tal functions may be affected,"'2 9 the court held that the commerce
clause permitted Congress to regulate discriminatory state employ-
ment practices "where the national interest in employment signifi-
cantly outweighs the state's interest in discriminatory employment
policies and practices."'2 0 Thus, both the Dallas and Board of
1970: Can Congress Compel State Cooperation in Achieving National Environmental
Standards?, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 701 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Environmental Standards].
"1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1970). The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 as an amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the minimum wage and maximum hours
provisions of which were held inapplicable against the states in League of Cities. See
text accompanying notes 86-102 supra.
In 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (1970).
'1 See Beaird & Ellington, supra note 86, at 69-72; Wage Requirements, supra
note 86, at 197-98.
21 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Texas 1976).
' Id. at 114. Accord, Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp.
637 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Christenson v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
' 421 F. Supp. at 115-16.
"= Id. at 116.
' 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
' Id. at 720.
131 Id. The court also postulated two alternative rationales. Stating that the ADEA
required only that the states refrain from discriminating, the court held that the Act
constituted only a limited intrusion that did not "directly displace the State's freedom
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Education decisions emphasize the balancing test suggested in the
opinions of Justice Rehnquist. 3'
By balancing the federal and state interests involved in these
commerce clause enactments, the Supreme Court, and these district
courts, gave new life to the tenth amendment and the concepts of
federalism implied in the Constitution. Although the League of Cities
Court expressly refrained from deciding whether these principles
limit other federal powers, 2 the tenth amendment may restrict the
methods chosen by Congress to implement legislation under those
powers. 3 3 The spending power3 4 seems particularly susceptible to
such an analysis. In recent years, conditional grants-in-aid 35 have
given Congress increased power over the states by permitting federal
regulatory power to reach areas over which the Constitution does not
explicitly authorize direct federal control. 138 Federal funding of state
activities has become so pervasive"7 that even if the most extreme
conditions were attached to the grants, state governments would




to structure integral operations." [emphasis added by the district court to League of
Cities quotation]. Id. at 719. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the ADEA has
a basis in the fourteenth amendment as well as the commerce clause which, under the
Fitzpatrick analysis, justified impinging state sovereignty to protect civil liberties. Id.
at 721. See also Commerce Clause Immunity, supra note 46, at 117-18.
I"1 See text accompanying notes 110-130 supra.
122 The League of Cities Court expressed no view as to whether the tenth amend-
ment will limit congressional attempts to affect integral operations of state govern-
ments by exercising authority granted Congress under the spending power, the enforce-
ment clause of the fourteenth amendment, or other such sections. See 426 U.S. at 852
n.17.
' See Environmental Standards, supra note 120, at 725.
' See note 40 and text accompanying notes 50-72 supra.
See generally, Tomlinson & Marshaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards
in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. Rlv. 600
(1972).
I See Environmental Standards, supra note 120, at 727; Conditional Spending,
supra note 51, at 293-96.
13 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that federal grants to state and
local governments in fiscal year 1977 will amount to 48 billion dollars, or 11.6 percent
of the national budget. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1978 10-11 (1977).
l2 In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947),
the Supreme Court suggested that the states' ability simply to refuse the federal aid
sufficiently protected their sovereignty. Id. at 143-44. See text accompanying notes 64-
68 supra.
-2g See Environmental Standards, supra note 120, at 728. Conditioning the receipt
of federal funds under numerous health programs upon compliance with the provisions
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If Congress may condition appropriations for the general welfare
upon any terms it chooses, the spending power presents "an effective
tool for eroding the concept of federalism inherent in the tenth
amendment."'40 Such an exercise of this power poses as great a threat
to traditional state governmental functions as the commerce clause
actions held invalid in League of Cities."' No valid constitutional
argument exists for restraining the direct use of the commerce power
against the states while conditions unrelated to the legislative goal
are attached to spending power enactments to "induce" states to
comply with federal proposals.' Since the concept of sovereignty
inherent in the tenth amendment is a recognized limitation on the
spending power,' the balancing test that has emerged from League
of Cities as a limitation on the commerce power' would likewise
appear to be an appropriate mechanism for weighing tenth amend-
ment attacks on the spending power."1
5
A balancing of federal and state interests would be particularly
helpful in resolving challenges to the use of the spending power in the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974.46
Although questions of health policy arguably are purely local matters
and not appropriate national concerns to justify federal expenditures
under the general welfare clause," 7 the nature of the problems facing
of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, see text
accompanying notes 14-29 supra, arguably preempts any possibility of a state choosing
not to participate in the program. The fiscal dependence of the health policy of many
states upon receipt of these funds effectively reduces the choice either to accept the
conditions or have no state health policy at all. See text accompanying notes 28-29
supra. See also Conditional Spending, supra note 51; Environmental Standards, supra
note 120, at 728.
" Conditional Spending, supra note 51, at 297.
m See text accompanying notes 86-102 supra.
See Environmental Standards, supra note 120, at 729.
11 See text accompanying notes 50-72 supra.
U See text accompanying notes 103-120 supra.
" The structural integrity of the federal system undoubtedly would receive less
than adequate protection if congressional discretion under the spending power remains
unchecked. As Justice Douglas remarked in his dissent in New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946)(Douglas, J., dissenting), "[t]he notion that the sovereign
position of the States must find its protection in the will of a transient majority of
Congress is foreign to and a negation of our constitutional system."
1' 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300t (Supp. V 1975). See text accompanying notes 11-29
supra.
"I See Memorandum for Plaintiff Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment at
15-19, North Carolina ex rel. Kirk v. Califano, No. 76-0049-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3,
1977), notice of appeal to S. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 1977. Cf. Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) ("It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish
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the present health care delivery system suggests that Congress justi-
fiably could conclude that the situation is of such a national scope
that action under the general welfare clause is warranted."' Never-
theless, the serious impact of the Act's penalty provisions upon tra-
ditional state legislative and fiscal functions requires that an accom-
modation be reached between the state and federal interests in-
volved. Balancing the strength of the national interests concerned
against the effect the legislation has upon essential state functions
provides an adequate mechanism for resolving the conflict.
The principal goal of the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act is to induce state legislatures to enact the compre-
hensive health planning system established by the Act.' The legisla-
tive function is, however, perhaps the most basic of all functions
exercised by a state. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Maryland v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency,'50 "if there is any attribute of sov-
ereignty left to the states it is the right of their legislatures to pass,
or not to pass, laws.' 15 ' The power of the states to pass laws and
and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone
there.") But cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (provision of
hospital services sufficiently affects interstate commerce to support antitrust action).
"I The health care industry operates outside the influence of the traditional mar-
ket system. In contrast to consumers of other services, the patient-consumer of health
care does not make the purchasing decisions as to the kind and quality of care, but
entrusts such decisions to his physician, the provider of the services. Furthermore, the
proliferation of third-party reimbursement mechanisms, such as private health insur-
ance or government assistance programs, greatly has attenuated the economic deter-
rents to the utilization of health care services which would exist in the normal market
system. Factors such as these have produced an inadequate assessment of the costs
and benefits of such services and consequently, a misallocation of resources. See Ken-
nedy, Preface: Public Concern and Federal Intervention in the Health Care Industry,
70 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975). In recent years, the rising public expectation that the
highest quality health care must be made available, and the unacceptability of higher
costs, have coalesced to give these health policy questions national scope and have
increased public pressure for federal intervention in the health care industry to ensure
equitable access to health care services. Id. at 1-2.
, See text accompanying notes 12-29 supra.
11 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), remanded as moot 431 U.S. 99 (1977). See note
120 supra.
"1' 530 F.2d at 225. The Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
recognized that the Constitution preserves the autonomy of both state legislative and
judicial departments, and any interference with either, except as to a matter specifi-
cally delegated to the United States, invades the authority of the states and denies
their independence. Id. at 78. Cf. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891)(right of the
people to choose their own administrative officers and pass their own laws inheres in
legislative powers reposed in representative government). Although the authority to
spend for the general welfare is a delegated power, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
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amend their constitutions is at the heart of the concept of powers
reserved to the states under the tenth amendment. 5 2 The National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act intrudes upon
these powers, however, by demanding that the states enact specific
legislation'5 3 or face withdrawal of funds in a broad range of federal
programs, with a consequent disruption, or perhaps destruction, of
state health policy.' 5 In such circumstances, whatever freedom of
choice the states possess in theory'55 is compromised in practice.'56
Faced with balancing federal interests in an integrated health policy
against preserving the integrity of state fiscal and legislative func-
tions, the restrictions inherent in the structure of federalism suggest
the conclusion that the use of the spending power in this manner
operates "to directly displace the State's freedom to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."',"
Such a conclusion does not suggest a substantial contraction of
congressional authority under the spending power.' 8 Applying the
tenth amendment balancing test requires only that Congress refrain
from large-scale intrusions into essential state functions.' 9 .The tradi-
tional congressional power to attach terms and conditions reasonably
90 (1976); note 57 supra, the congressional exercises of 1he spending power, unlike other
powers of Congress, has not been forced upon the states under the supremacy clause.
See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
12 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 359 (1966) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
' Certificates of need laws exemplify the mandatory legislation required by the
Act. See note 25 supra. The Act also intrudes upon state administrative functions by
imposing duties upon the governor, see 42 U.S.C. § 3001(b)(Supp. V 1975), and review-
ing the execution of administrative functions relating to health policy, see id. § 300m-
1. The state agencies which it creates further infringe upon the administrative func-
tions of the state governments. Such interference "impermissibly displaces state poli-
cies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those governmental
services which their citizens require." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
849 (1976).
151 See 42 U.S.C. § 300m(d)(Supp. V 1975). In particular, North Carolina alleges
that the withdrawal of these funds from the states' health budget would destroy the
states' health care system. See note 28 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
156 See text accompanying notes 135-139 supra.
"5 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S..833, 852 (1976).
IS The balancing test serves simply to clarify the reasonable relation standard.
See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra. Requiring the existence of a reasonable
relation between the condition and the purpose of a spending program in effect recog-
nizes that countervailing interests do exist. The balancing test focuses on these inter-
ests rather than exclusively on the relationship. The test does not introduce a new
element into the analysis, but merely adds greater emphasis to an existing one.
"Is See text accompanying notes 110-145 supra.
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related to the purposes of a spending program need not be im-
paired.6 0 The balancing test is sufficiently flexible to protect these
federal interests. As with the less drastic means test in the first
amendment context,' 1 if a less intrusive method of accomplishing the
federal goal is available, balancing the competing interests involved
in tenth amendment cases serves to affirm the federal policy underly-
ing an enactment while protecting the states from the legislation's
intrusive means.'
62
The protection accorded traditional state interests by the League
of Cities Court brings new meaning to the concept of federalism.
Although the contours of this protection are as yet ill-defined, the
constitutional balance between federal and state interests clearly is
undergoing a reappraisal. Whatever character the new balance as-
sumes, the legislative process is unquestionably an essential state
function that should be protected under the tenth amendment.
Because this interest is as susceptible to intrusion under the condi-
tional spending power as under the commerce power, the inherent
protections of the federal system that have been found to limit the
commerce power should likewise be applied to the spending power.
Balancing the relevant state and federal interests involved will effec-
tively protect state sovereignty while furthering the goals of legisla-
tion like the National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 1974.
THOMAS M. TREZISE
,' See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J.
464 (1969).
,52 See Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 86, at 1888-91.
